Thomas Paul Kneen was born on the 18th of June, 1914 to Edwyn Corlett and Cecil Maud Kneen in Douglas, the Isle of Man. Educated at Haileybury College in rural Hertfordshire (England), and then Oxford University, he took a position with the British Colonial Administration Service in the Solomon Islands where he was stationed on Guadalcanal.
Kneen served in a militia unit prior to enlisting in the A.I.F. in Sydney on the 10th of October, 1940, and trained with the 1st Cadre of personnel at No.7 Infantry Training Centre on Wilson’s Promontory in remote southern Victoria. No.7 I.T.C. trained men in guerrilla warfare for service in the Australian Independent Companies – loosely modelled on the British Commandos. Kneen was by this stage a captain.
Rather than embark with the 1st Australian Independent Company however (which was lucky, as it turned out, for roughly half the company were later killed), Paul Kneen set out on a most secret mission to the French Pacific colony of New Caledonia. The fact that he was a member of the Intelligence Corps and could speak eight languages – including French – indicated his great aptitude for such an important task.
Between the 4th of June and the 23rd of October, 1941 – prior to the war in the Pacific beginning – masquerading as ‘Gunner Keen’, an innocuous member of the small group of Australian artillerymen (‘Robin Force’) providing training and assistance to the French, he researched for and compiled a report detailing the political leanings of the population (civil and military/ Free French or Vichy supporters) and the ‘scope for Independent Company activities’ on the island. It was the former object – ascertaining the ‘feelings’ and tendencies of the French, indigenous and foreign sections of the population – that was the most important, for there was still only a very small military presence in the colony, and Allied authorities were unsure which way the island – only hours by aircraft east of Brisbane, Australia – might ‘swing.’
Returning to Australia, Kneen was promoted to the rank of major and given command of No.5 Australian Independent Company. After completing their training at ‘The Prom’, No.5 entrained for Queensland before embarking for Papua on the 13th of April, reaching Port Moresby four days later.
After some weeks spent at Port Moresby while the outcome of the Battle of the Coral Sea was still in doubt, in late May the Fifth emplaned for the Wau-Bulolo Valley, becoming the first complete military unit to be flown into a forward battle area.
As the main element of ‘Kanga Force’ the Fifth Company had the role of protecting the Wau-Bulolo Valley – a former gold-mining area pre-war – and its aerodromes, and of monitoring the activities of the Japanese in Salamaua and Lae, harassing them where possible without provoking any large scale responses.
It was in just this harassment role – for which the coy had been well trained – that Major Kneen was given orders to plan and conduct a platoon-sized raid (an Ind. Coy platoon was roughly 67 strong) against the Japanese outpost of Heath’s Plantation in the Markham Valley.
The object of the raid, at a time where everywhere else in the Pacific area the Allies had been pushed further backwards, was to “destroy all personnel, field gun and ammunition, wireless plant (if any) and obtain papers, articles and information of military value at Heath’s Plantation; to destroy the bridge on the Markham Road over the Bewapi Creek.”
Heath’s was approximately 8 miles (almost 13 kilometres) north-west of the strong Japanese base at Lae at the head of the Huon Gulf, and sat astride the Lae-Nadzab Road; Nadzab being an airstrip further inland in the Markham Valley and the site of one of the very few parachute drops in the South West Pacific Area by Allied troops fifteen months later in September, 1943.
As a result of daring reconnaissances by Kneen himself and others including Sergeants Booth and Emery, Heath’s was estimated to have been garrisoned by a force of 50 to 60 men who were armed with a light field gun, machine guns, sub-machine guns, automatic rifles, and grenades.
Against this, Kneen’s party consisted of four officers and 54 other ranks: Numbers 4 and 8 Sections of his 5th Independent Company, elements of “A” Company of the N.G.V.R. (New Guinea Volunteer Rifles – the territorial force which had preceded No.5 in the area), and a detachment of the New Guinea Force Independent Mortar Platoon without their mortars.
The plan for the raid included the bridge demolition party also being responsible for destroying the field gun and ammunition after “taking samples of the various types of shells.” The field gun – the calibre was never established with any certainty – was not considered to have been manned on a permanent basis, and was thus not given a high priority. It was a mistake that would cost them dearly.
The raiding party was armed with 21 Thompson Sub-Machine Guns, 37 rifles, 48 revolvers and 116 four-second hand grenades, which amounted to only two each.
They began their approach mid afternoon on the 29th of June. Major Kneen and Rifleman Savage of the NGVR made a last reconnaissance at 1630 hours on the 30th and simultaneously Sgt. Booth also made a reconnaissance. In the last half hour of the 30th, while making their approaches to their various positions, the men heard the deep barking of a dog and a Japanese voice evidently trying to calm it. This dog was later mentioned as a reason for the enemy being more alert than had been expected.
Bright moonlight forced the scouts to shoot the sentries rather than dispose of them silently as they had been trained. The attack began at 0220 hours as the first sentry was killed. Despite the moonlit night, a light fog had enveloped the house and surrounds, perhaps assisting the escape of 10-15 Japanese from the rear of the house towards Lae, mistakenly believed to be members of the attacking force. According to the official report of the action written afterwards, the field gun opened fire and from a distance of only 30 yards, hit and immediately killed Major Kneen. Reports differ as to whether Kneen was killed by the first or last of the three shells fired. Lance-Corporal Matthews was wounded by shell fragments. Unofficially, some members of the raiding party speculated that Major Kneen – who “was in the open calling for Lt. Wylie and Cpl. Smith” at the time and thus attracted attention to himself as a leader – could have been killed by one of his own grenades, prematurely exploding after being struck by a bullet. Two officers examined him to confirm that whatever the cause, Major Paul Kneen, in his first offensive action with his company, was very dead.
As a result of this sudden loss, and the suspicion that enemy reinforcements were moving up behind them, the attack was called off by Lt. Wylie who had assumed command, and the men fled back along the valley. The engagement had lasted for 20-25 minutes.
Forty-two of the enemy had been killed, but Paul Kneen’s body was not retrieved. He is commemorated on the Memorial Roll for the missing at the Lae War Cemetery, Papua New Guinea.
[References are available on request].
What a loss for the 5th. A very talented man lost right at the start. We’ll never know what he might have gone on to do.