The weight carried on the person by an infantry soldier has throughout history partly determined how, where, and how well he fought. Other elements such as intelligence on the enemy, skill in the use of weapons and tactics, and topographical and weather conditions have also helped to influence the outcome of conflicts. However the effectiveness of the individual infantryman – the basic ‘building block’ of a land army – is and has been dictated by what he had to carry, for protection, use against the enemy, and sustenance, and how far he could carry it.
In the 7th Century B.C., Assyrian spearmen were thought to have borne a load, including weapons and iron scale armour, of between 27.5 kilograms and 36.5 kg. Greek Hoplites (infantry), who were considered to have weighed not much more than 68kgs themselves, could have borne similar weights of 22.5 to 32 kg. The Hoplite shield weighed between 6 and 8 kg, though the Hoplites may have had a slave to carry their equipment on the march. Macedonians of the time might have carried a total load of 36 kilograms, which included 22.5 kg of equipment and arms (the spear, or sarissa was between 5.5 and 7.5 kg depending on its length), plus ten days rations weighing 13.5kg. A Macedonian army was capable of marching 21 kilometres each day with these loads.
Roman soldiers at the time of Gaius Marius, about 100 BC, may have carried loads of between 22.5 and 45.5 kilograms, the variation hinging partly on debate about how much of the individual legionary’s weight would have been carried by mules. Some historians have suggested that the loads carried by individual soldiers depended upon the context: an ‘approach marching load’ of 20 kilograms may have been reduced to the 15kg ‘tactical combat load’ once combat was inevitable. A Roman legionary of the time may have had an average body weight of just 66 kilograms, and was expected to march up to 32 kilometres per day.
Soldiers of the Byzantine (eastern Roman) empire were thought to have worn, where affordable, of course, armour or a shirt of mail weighing 16 kilograms, in addition to other protective items such as greaves (for the shins) and gauntlets (for the hands), along with their weapons which included a sword, spiked axe, spear and lance. This made a total load of between 19.5 and 36.5 kilograms.
Baggage trains (utilising horses, mules and carts or wagons) of the period are considered to have been predominantly for items other than the arms, armour and other items of individual soldiers, such as food supplies, tentage if available, and siege machines.
A pikeman of the English Civil War (1638 – 1651), wore – if he was lucky – armour weighing about 11 kilograms, which included helmets and leg guards, along with a knapsack weighing between 22.5 and 17.5 kgs containing any personal belongings (such as spare clothing) and their food supply. Their primary weapon, the pike, which was just over 2 metres in length (the older style pikes were between 4.9 and 5.5 metres long), weighed between 1.8 and 2.3 kilograms.
British line infantry of the American War of Independence (early 19th Century), equipped with muskets and bayonets as their primary weapons, carried average loads of 36.5 kilograms; their French enemy during the Battle of Waterloo (1815) burdened with perhaps 25kg of equipment, weapons etc. Forty years later during the Crimean War, the loads carried by the British infantry had not changed much (26-31kg),
A British WW1 trench coat, which weighed 3.2 kilograms when dry, could absorb as much as an extra 9 kilograms when waterlogged. A U.S. overcoat in the same conflict could absorb about 3.6 extra kilograms of water.
Australian artillery gunners in Borneo during the Indonesian Confrontation (1962-1966) carried between 28 and 55kgs of equipment, supplies, weapons etc.
U.S. Army soldiers in Iraq in 2007 were required to wear 13.6 kilograms of body armour.
While the weights above are averages, and those for the pre-modern periods are speculative, we might imagine how such loads affected a commander’s ability to tactically plan his battles. If troops are overloaded, their physical fitness may have decreased considerably after a long approach march, or if transport is available, the load-carrying capacity of the vehicle determines how many can be carried, and hence how many trips might be needed to deposit troops into the necessary pre-battle positions. If the foot soldier’s burden is decreased, however, he may arrive at the point of contact without some of equipment necessary for his role.
In the flurry and flourish of the military history narrative, such elements as logistics and the infantryman’s load are often overlooked, despite being vital to the outcome.
[References are available upon request].
